Risk and Safety Management Sample Essay

1. Introduction

“Things will travel incorrect in any given state of affairs. if you give them a chance” ( Murphy’s jurisprudence ) .

On November 13. 2002. the heavy fuel oil oiler Prestige sprang a leak in its hull on the Galician seashore. When the first troubles were realised. the vessel’s maestro refused the support of a towboat due to be factors. Subsequently on. four towboats attempted to deliver the leaking oil oiler. The Spanish authorities refused to give permission for the vas to take safety in one of their ports. make up one’s minding alternatively to put it out at sea. Finally. on November 19. 2002. the oiler broke into two parts and sank ( Guardian 2002 ) .

The Prestige catastrophe raises the inquiry of whether it could hold been avoided and if all safeguards had been taken. Other serious accidents at sea. such as the foundation of the container ship Rena on a reef in New Zealand in 2011 or the capsizing of the Costa Concordia in 2012. all likewise identified the human factor as one of the most important causes ( Porter 2012 ; Anon 2012 ) .

Whether accidents do oil pollution. loss of life or any other harm. the chief issue that arises in these state of affairss is the inquiry of maritime safety and in connexion with this. a well-implemented and robust safety civilization. Safety civilizations can easy neglect due to a assortment of grounds. One could be the manner of direction. as this can change to a big extent ( Roughton and Mercurio 2002 ) .

Safety is of the extreme importance in the maritime industry. as incidents and accidents can hold a annihilating consequence on worlds. vas. lading and the environment ( Cooper 2001 ) . The Accident Database Review of Human-Element Concerns Report 2004 by the American Bureau of Transporting provinces that “human mistake continues to be a dominant factor in about 80 to 85 % of maritime accidents” ( Baker 2004. p. 1 ) ; hence. the bar of this contributes greatly to a strong safety civilization in nautical administrations.

Within the last 12 months three of our vass have been involved in serious incidents. In order to forestall such incidents from developing into accidents and to forestall farther incidents the intent of this study is to critically analyze and measure the importance of a more robust safety civilization for our company with the purpose of developing and implementing it on board our vass.

2. Literature Survey and critical rating and analysis of safety civilization

2. 1 Critical rating of safety civilization components

The term “safety culture” was ab initio used after the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986. in order to look into that the chief subscriber for such catastrophes and accidents is non needfully technology design or equipment failure. but people. “poor human performance” ( Taylor 2010. p. 1 ) . However. since so. a broad scope of different industries has defined safety civilization. connoting assorted signifiers of reading.

The International Atomic Energy Authority ( IAEA ) defines safety civilization in their context as “that assembly of features and attitudes in administrations and persons which established that. as an overruling precedence. atomic works safety issues receive the attending warranted by their significance” ( Clarke. 2000. p. 66 ) . The Confederation of British Industry ( CBI ) nevertheless. focuses more on the common perceptual experiences toward safety civilization of all parties involved. specifying it as “ideas and beliefs that all members of the administration portion about hazard. accidents and ill health” ( Hurst 1998. p. 21 ) .

The Health and Safety Commission ( HSC ) defines safety civilization as the result of the combined interactions of “individual and group values. attitudes. perceptual experiences. competences. and forms of behavior that determine the committedness to. and the manner and proficiency of. an organisation’s wellness and safety management” ( Antonsen 2009. p. 16 ) . Although all these constituents contribute to safety as a whole. as they take into history a whole scope of psychological factors. other elements contributed by the administration. such as a safety direction system. hold to be taken into consideration as good.

Cooper ( 2001. p. 15 ) defines safety civilization as “the merchandise of multiple end directed interactions between people ( psychological ) . occupations ( behavioral ) and the administration ( situational ) ” .

( Figure 2: Cooper`s Reciprocal Safety Culture Model. beginning: Cooper 2001 )

Cooper ( 2001. p. 15 ) argues that safety civilization depends on a “dynamic inter-relationship” in an administration. driven by the constituents of perceptual experience and the attitudes the forces has towards it. every bit good as the organisation`s safety purposes. combined with the day-to-day goal-oriented safety behavior of each person. In add-on. he emphasises that the handiness and quality of the company’s safety direction systems play a important function in lending to a goal-oriented behavior. This construct can be seen as chiseled. consisting the chief countries which affect safety civilization. However. the construct has a lack. as it does non see that some of the specific constituents might lend more to a coveted degree of safety civilization than others. The person-psychological factor is decidedly the most hard 1. as it is the people themselves who have to run safely. Rules and prescriptions can easy be changed. However. people’s perceptual experience and committedness every bit good as personal goal-setting in correspondence to the organisation’s safety civilization present some troubles. Hence. Rothblum ( 2005 ) argues that focal point has to be on the human constituent. as it is people who will do alterations in safety civilization.

Furthermore. Weick ( 1987. p. 113 ) identifies that a well-established safety civilization requires a “clear apprehension of the system and its safety characteristics. positive attitudes towards safety steps. and an inducement system that encourages safety in operations” . Furthermore. Thai and Grewal ( 2006 ) argue that safety civilization has to be viewed as the footing of all factors that contribute to safety direction.

Thai and Grewal ( 2006. p. 290 ) place “management commitment” and “employee involvement” as the two most of import constituents lending to safety civilization. They argue that the quality of safety public presentation in an administration is chiefly dependent on the quality of direction attitude. alternatively of merely trusting on safety processs and ordinances. and define safety civilization as an “attitude of mind” . Thus. safety civilization must put critical accent on its communicating flow in the administration traveling from the highest degree of the organisation’s hierarchy to the lowest. Furthermore. it is important that both senior direction and employees pay their extreme attending to safety and promote other members of the administration to make similarly. Therefore. personal committedness. duty. communicating and acquisition are some of the key elements which contribute to a safety civilization but these have to be implemented by higher-level direction ( Havold 2005 ) .

Historically. nautical focal point on safety was chiefly based on proficient betterments. Nowadays. accent is progressively placed on the part of the human factor in regard of accident happenings. Rothblum ( 2005. p. 1 ) argues that although ship construction and the dependability of ship systems have been greatly improved in the yesteryear. the hazard of accidents has merely been somewhat reduced. as the human factor is still mostly responsible for accidents in the maritime system.

The following table identifies the part of human mistake to marine accidents:

|Type of accident |Percentage | |tanker accidents |84-88 % | |towing vessel foundations |79 % | |collisions |89-96 % | |fires and detonations |75 % |

( Figure 3: Contribution of human mistakes to marine accidents. beginning: Rothblum 2005 )

Therefore. this is where the trouble arises. A system and regulations can be measured and changed. but the human constituent is far excessively complex to be measured and controlled. The safety of transporting relies to a big extent on mariners. Mistakes occur if a crew has deficient cognition of safety and has non internalised it. Reasons can be inappropriate on the job direction. working atmosphere or civilization. and the crew’s perceptual experience of working ( Hetherington et al. 2005 ) . Therefore. Rothblum ( 2005. p. 2 ) argues that in order to cut down marine casualties. “we must get down to concentrate on the types of human mistakes that cause casualties” .

The International Maritime Organisation ( IMO ) defines a company with a well-implemented safety civilization as one that gives “appropriate precedence to safety and realises that safety has to be managed like other countries of the business” ( IMO 2011 ) . In regard of shipboard operations the administration outlines that a safety civilization implies making the “right thing at the right clip in response to normal and exigency situations” ( IMO 2011 ) . and mariners have to give the highest precedence to safety civilization. The IMO ( IMO 2011 ) argues that a high quality safety civilization can be achieved if there is a witting acknowledgment by each person that accidents can be avoided if processs are followed with the extreme diligence in conformity with ordinances. Additionally. there must be lasting. internalised safety thought and a changeless nisus towards betterment.

Harmonizing to the HSC a strong incorporate safety civilization in an administration is achieved by “communications founded on common trust. by shared perceptual experiences of the importance of safety and by assurance in the efficaciousness of preventative measures” ( Clarke. 2000. p. 67 ) .

2. 2 Analysis of recommendations for the development of a more robust safety civilization

Thai and Grewal ( 2006 ) place that the development and execution of a strong safety civilization is of the extreme importance for a transportation company. In the nautical universe. taking into consideration the assorted possible jeopardies. a robust safety civilization will forestall hurts and salvage lives every bit good as protect the Marine environment ( Hansen et al. 2002 ) .

Borodzicz ( 2005. p. 41 ) argues that by bettering the safety civilization of an administration. economic efficiencies will besides accrue and the administration will profit from net income both in the long- and the short-run. It contributes positively to an increased profitableness. lowering costs. increasing the efficiency of staff. maintaining or bettering the public repute and bettering quality. dependability. and fight ( Taylor 2010 ) . Furthermore. Esbensen et Al. ( 1985 ) argue that an evidently well-implemented safety civilization in an administration is besides really of import from an economic point of position as charterers make their determinations between vass harmonizing to the handiness and quality of safety on board.

However. there are assorted challenges when developing and implementing a strong safety civilization in an administration. Challenges can be seen from a fiscal point of position. Furthermore. due to its development over many centuries. the Marine industry has traditionally been really conservative. New thoughts and constructs have frequently been avoided until an obvious success has become seeable. Safety is perceived as being really cost intensive and it appears to be hard to show that safety and profitableness go manus in manus ( Vaughn 2011 ) .

2. 2. 1 Safety civilization reappraisal

Taylor ( 2010 ) argues that before developing a safety civilization in an administration. a safety civilization reappraisal has to be conducted in order to analyze possible safety civilization features and back uping properties. This can be achieved by quantitative ( i. e. questionnaires. interviews. ascertained human public presentation ) and qualitative appraisals ( i. e. by a reappraisal psychologist ) . However. in order to accomplish a representative consequence. a combination of both is required.

2. 2. 2 Development of a safety direction system

Harmonizing to Roughton and Mercurio ( 2002 ) . the execution of a safety direction system ( SMS ) will back up a successful safety civilization. The safety direction system of a company outlines how safety is treated in the workplace and in which manner peculiar policies and processs are implemented. However. it is supposed to be treated as an active constituent of an organisation’s direction system. and non merely as a “written set of policies and procedures” ( Kuo 1998. p. 168 ) .

The IMO provinces that all employees have to be actively incorporate and experience responsible for lending to safety ( IMO 2011 ) and reflect this in “The International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention” ( ISM Code ) ( SOLAS 2009 ) . However. even if safety civilization is closely linked to the ISM Code. it represents merely the minimal criterion in order to accomplish maritime safety. significance that farther steps should be integrated for a more robust safety civilization ( Thai and Grewal 2006 ) .

2. 2. 3 Three degree scheme for the development of a more robust safety civilization

For the development of a robust safety civilization. Cooper ( 2001. p. 34 ) argues that a three degree scheme has to be adopted. consisting an “immediate. intermediate and ultimate” degree of attempt.

To accomplish an immediate degree of attempt. strategic programs foremost have to be developed and implemented in order to wholly incorporate safety into the administration. taking into consideration all divisions of the administration. There should be an accent on the quality of the safety leading. intending the senior direction squad in the company ( The Nautical Institute 1997 ) . Hence. Cooper ( 2001. p. 18 ) suggests a “Management Control System” dwelling of exactly formulated and “measurable aims. monitoring processs and regular feedback” . In order to make a robust safety civilization. it is imperative that the enforcement of strategic programs is monitored and reviewed on a regular footing. Furthermore. the consequences have to be on a regular basis communicated to all employees. therefore. a communicating system and an organizational construction have to be guaranteed. Additionally. a safety practician is of great importance in an administration seeking a positive safety civilization.

This individual must hold “direct. independent and unimpeded access” to all entities of the administration. including the senior direction squad ( Cooper 2001. p. 5 ) . Harmonizing to the ISM Code. “one or more designated individuals ashore shall hold direct entree to the highest degree of management” ( Kuo 1998. p. 156 ) . Furthermore. the organisation’s hazard control system presents a farther important characteristic. Kristiansen ( 2005 ) argues that the combination of hazard analysis and hazard appraisal procedures will lend to a robust safety civilization where hazard analysis is a hazard ciphering procedure for the designation of jeopardies. Subsequently. hazard appraisal is the procedure utilizing the consequences obtained in hazard analysis to better safety through hazard decrease by presenting safety steps. The procedure is illustrated in the undermentioned figure:

( Figure 4: The procedure of hazard analysis and hazard appraisal. beginning: Kristiansen 2005 )

Furthermore. there are assorted techniques recommended for the designation of jeopardies. Kuo ( 1998 ) identifies the Fault Tree Analysis ( FTA ) and the Event Tree Analysis ( ETA ) as the chief instruments for the measuring of happening and gravitation of the effects sing jeopardies with regard to put on the line analysis. Whereas the FTA theoretical account provides an instrument for the designation of critical. unwanted happenings ( for case. the appraisal of chance sing the loss of the propulsion map on a oiler ) . the ETA theoretical account goes beyond this and estimations and analyses the possible effects of an event or incident ( Kristiansen 2005 ) .

In add-on. subdivision 11 of the ISM Code states that a safety direction manual has to be drawn up and used to depict what the organisation`s specific safety direction system contains ( SOLAS 2009 ) . Harmonizing to Roughton and Mercurio ( 2002 ) . such an organisation’s direction brochure provides a farther index of a positive safety civilization. but it must be actively used.

The 2nd portion of the threefold scheme is the intermediate degree of attempt. This is concerned with the development of a direction information system. which. inter alia. is supposed to measure current safety activities and to mensurate their effectivity ( Cooper 2001 ) . Florczak ( 2002 ) argues that the development of a monitoring system plays a farther important function by reexamining the whole safety direction system on a regular and planned footing.

The 3rd portion of Cooper’s scheme. the ultimate degree of attempt. is concerned with convincing people and actively prosecuting them in the organisation’s safety cause. He argues that this should be achieved by developing “high quality safety preparation programmes” . including encouraging and authorising employees to integrate safety into their daily on the job modus operandi ( Cooper 2001. p. 233 ) .

2. 2. 4 Psychological factors

However. the most ambitious facet is posed by the psychological factor. People’s values and perceptual experiences can barely be measured and furthermore. due to their nature. they are really immune to alter. New enforced alterations can bring forth a sense of insecurity and raise frights ( Vaughn 2011 ) .

In the maritime industry mariners exhibit a broad assortment of personal properties sing cognition and competency. On board the vass there is frequently a combination of mariners with different nationalities and from different backgrounds and civilizations. Even though the seafarers` cognition and competency is regulated on an international footing controlled by the criterions of the STCW Code ( Standards of Training. Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers ) . their degree varies to a great extent as they have been educated and trained at different topographic points. Hence. group work will be the consequence of people with single cognition. experience and cultural background and this may present some troubles. These troubles can be. for illustration. the consequence of laterality or a deficiency of communicating accomplishments ( Hetherington et al. 2005 ) . A safety civilization should guarantee that the whole crew portion the same values and has the same purposes which should finally ensue in self-regulation. Valuess and behavior should conform to all the safety criterions and. ideally. these should be enthusiastically followed. ( Esbensen et al. 1985 ) .

Kuo ( 1998. p. 170 ) argues that in order to develop a positive civilization for Marine activities. a collaborative doctrine is required and needs to be adopted in the administration and defines such a doctrine as follows: “the best solutions are normally derived via close coaction between the prescribing governments and the users” . The major values of such a doctrine are duties shared by both parties to get the better of the autocratic nature of normative ordinances. Over clip. such a doctrine is supposed to promote the development of positive attitudes to safety affairs ( Kuo. 1998 ) . Vaughn ( 2011 ) argues farther that common regard and self-respect when covering with each other. lovingness and looking out for one another are the keys to making a successful safety civilization. Hence. the direction of an administration with a well-implemented safety civilization does non punish staff. but motivates and encourages them ( Thai and Grewal 2006 ) .

Safety has to be included as a manner of life ( Thai and Grewal 2006 ) .

3. Critical rating of the execution of the new safety civilization on board the vass

Finally. there will be a construct consisting supported recommendations for the execution of a strong safety civilization on board the vass. taking to a clip graduated table for the execution procedure.

The analysis shows that the execution of a robust safety civilization will be extremely good and profitable for the company in that it will lend positively non merely in the context of general safety on board the ships. but furthermore. it will take to fiscal benefits.

It is imperative that the highest degree of nautical safety is aimed for. significance that safety ever has to be the first precedence in the crew’s day-to-day operating concern and has to be ingrained in every manager`s and employee`s head. A alteration towards a more robust safety civilization will be greatly focused on single committedness.

The execution construct will consist a agenda that will dwell of eight chief stairss:

( Figure 5: Agenda for execution. beginning: ain building )

1. The strong safety civilization has to be prioritised as a extremely of import portion of the organisation’s civilization

Therefore. a safety doctrine has to be implemented. to be prioritised by every member of the administration. including the highest degree of direction. The doctrine will incorporate a safety vision. cardinal policies. purposes. processs. and strategic and operational programs. to be committed by the senior direction and to be communicated to all employees every bit good as to be apparent in day-to-day activities at all degrees. This doctrine of safety is based on a construct of continual betterment. personal committedness and duty on the portion of everyone in the company. Safety is considered as a uninterrupted. ceaseless procedure. The interrelated successful operation of the administrations both on board and ashore is a basic demand and both must hold common ends. Hence. there must be short communicating ways. Short decision-making procedures by the direction will simplify work on safety and convey strategic programs closer to realization.

2. Clear safety policies

The SMS will be separately monitored and adopted on every individual one of our vass ( as they are non of the same type ) . Safety criterions above the ISM Code prescriptions are extremely sought after. All undertakings that have critical safety deductions have to be identified and criterions and processs have to be created in these countries. Our safety policies will be reviewed in our safety direction manual. consisting structured policies besides in regard of wages and penalty sing safety affairs. For easy entree this manual will be available in electronic signifier. In peculiar. our policies outline that we operate in a “no-blame” civilization. in order to back up failure transparence. Therefore. failure studies shall non incorporate names. merely “crew-culture” .

This is of extreme importance. so that people tell the truth. The company`s outlook reflects the thought that safety is an intrinsic portion of day-to-day work patterns and unsafe actions will non be tolerated. Furthermore. safety ordinances have to be established and to be purely followed. from the top to the underside of the hierarchy. by the transportation company every bit good as by the crew and frailty versa. Furthermore. subordinated staff must be allowed to halt superior staff in instances where wrong determinations are being made. Charterers and 3rd parties have to accept that vass can be delayed due to safety preparation.

3. Establishing and keeping a safe workplace and working environment

A safe workplace will be guaranteed on each of the vass due to the execution of appropriate single safety direction systems. This will be adjusted to our safety civilization and its demands and rules. Additionally. the proviso of resources and safety equipment will be assured. Furthermore. our safety civilization doctrine will besides be taken into consideration during the procedure of enlisting.

Additionally. there will be a warrant that vass are on a regular basis improved by a rigorous care doctrine ( complete integrated preventative computerised care system for each single vas ) .

4. Full committedness to safety by leading and crew

Senior direction committedness is indispensible. This means effectual. regular communicating about safety on a horizontal and perpendicular degree between directors and crew. The crew`s consciousness of a positive attitude toward safety has to be examined. Forces on board and ashore have to move safely and responsibly at all times.

The DPA ( Designated Person Ashore ) must be competent and have a good apprehension of the construct of safety civilization. It is critical that the DPA is acknowledged by the whole forces as a “trustworthy” individual. in order to make assurance. His function is highly of import and he has to be loyal to everybody.

5. Changing personnel’s behavior

A strong safety civilization can merely be achieved if both forces ashore and mariners start believing in safety. act that manner and invariably strive to do betterments. All employees have to be encouraged to analyze and constructively discuss safety issues. and to be willing to take positive determinations in this respect without fright of reverberations from directors or co-workers. In add-on. attending should be paid to the composing of the crew. The same crew should be placed on certain ships over a period of clip. at least some old ages. in order to accomplish committedness at the workplace. This is critically of import as people have to hold a feeling of trust and designation with the company in order to transport out safety steps on the footing of the safety doctrine of the company.

For the crew. the vas as a workplace must besides be attractive as a topographic point to populate. The whole environment has to be such that everybody feels comfy and can transport out leisure activities. Additionally. at that place has to be regular internal preparation and inducements for calling chances have to be provided. If the crew is basking their work. this will hold a positive impact on maritime safety work.

Peoples have to be motivated and given inducements. e. g. by agencies of congratulations or fillip systems.

If safety ordinances are repeatedly disregarded. forces must be expelled from the company with immediate consequence.

6. Adequate proviso of preparation

In order to accomplish an appropriate. goal-related attitude and public presentation. the quality and effectivity of the seafarers’ instruction and preparation dramas an of import function. Training Sessionss have to be conducted on a regular footing every bit good as exigency response preparation. Safety preparation has to be repeated on a regular footing for everybody ( shore- and sea-personnel ) in preparation Centres ashore and should be conducted in an interesting and apprehensible manner with enthusiastic qualified trainers. and non merely carried out on board with tiring computerised preparation systems.

7. Implementing hazard direction

Hazard analyses and hazard appraisals have to be carried out and as a effect. farther steps implemented. If countermeasures have been applied. this has to be reported. Guidance for the procedure of hazard appraisal and control will be as follows:

( Figure 6: Agenda for hazard appraisal and control.
beginning: Germanischer Lloyd 2010 )

8. Making a good rating and control system of safety direction

Finally. the execution of a safety direction control system will be indispensable. Therefore. the company’s current public presentation will be efficaciously monitored on a regular footing in order to better uninterrupted safety. Furthermore. increased importance will be attached to a system consisting the coverage of near-misses. that is really of import in the designation of jeopardies and the turning away of accidents. Therefore. inducements have to be given so that people will subject these studies. Hazards have to be recognised. Plans have to be devised in order to place jeopardies on different ships. In order to avoid accidents. it is besides really of import to alleviate people’s emphasis. In this context. good pre-planning in the squad is of import. Internal and external monitoring will be conducted on a regular footing on all vass every bit good as in the office. including a direction reappraisal.

In the followers. there will be a timescale sketching the procedure of the safety civilization execution:

( Figure 7: Timescale for safety civilization execution. beginning: ain building )

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